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Chapter 1: Introduction 
List of Abbreviations 
BiH                                                                         Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CFWG                                                                    Community Foundation of West Georgia 
CoE                                                                         Council of Europe   
DPA                                                                        Dayton Peace Agreement                    
EUPM                                                                     European Union Police Mission in Bosnia                                 
FBiH                                                                       Federation of Bosnia 
HRCC                                                                     Human Rights Co-ordination Centre  
ICG                                                                          International Crisis Group 
ICTY                                                            International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IDPs/DPs                                                              Internally Displaced Person 
IEBL                                                                       Inter-Entity Border Line 
OHR                                                                        Office of the High Representative 
OHRB                                                                     Office of the High Representative for Bosnia 
OSCE                                                                     Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PIC                                                                          Peace Implementation Council 
RS                                                                           Republic of Serbia (Republika Srpska) 
RRTF                                                                      Reconstruction and Return Task Force 
SDA                                                                         Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokrastke 
Akcije) 
UNHCR                                                                  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNHCRHR                                                          United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNSCR                                                                   United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
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Clarification of Concepts 
Arbitration 
Arbitration is when there is an agreement or settling between different parties by a third 
party. 
Demagoguery 
A person, especially an orator or political leader, who gains power and 
popularity by arousing the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the people. 
IDP 
IDP stand for ‘Internally Displaced Person’. The acronym is used to define people who flee 
his/her home but remain within the national border in their home country.  
Repatriation 
Repatriation means that you send a person back to their home country. 
Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia (The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is the territory that dissolved 
in 1991. It consisted of six republics that made up the federation - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina) and  
Slovenia.  
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Problem Area 
In 1991, the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) consisted of 4.5 million people; 
Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians (Nowak 2004: 48). In this period, 
Yugoslavia disintegrated under the pressures of ethnic conflict, economic issues, and the 
demagoguery of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (Office of the Historian 2013). This led 
to a war, which lasted 43 months and resulted in 2.3 million people fleeing (Heimerl 2006: 
75). 1.3 million were refugees abroad and one million remained in BiH as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs)(Allock 2004: 32-33). These would have been the minority in BiH if they 
returned to their pre-war homes (Heimerl 2006: 75). Due to the forced ethnic migrations, it 
was the worst refugee crisis in Europe since Second World War (Heimerl 2006: 71).  
In the beginning of 1996, there were three million people left in BiH. 80 percent of the 
population were affected by the war in BiH, which then was a multi-ethnic country of 
coexistence and tolerance (Cigar 1995 cited in Heimerl 2006: 71). The demography was 
completely changed and the pre-war municipalities were no longer existing (Heimerl 2006: 
71). However, there was some great return movements, especially in 1996, when over 
250,000 refugees and IDPs returned. Despite this, it declined in the years 1997 and 1998, and 
yet, these returns were typically to areas where the returnees themselves were part of the 
majority group. (Heimerl 2006: 73) These areas existed in most parts of the country, with 
only a handful of areas containing minority populations greater than 10 percent (about 13 per 
cent in Tuzla and Sarajevo cantons). Simultaneously, the return of refugees contributed 
significantly to the IDP problem, inflating their ranks and worsening the situation of those 
already displaced (Heimerl 2006: 74). 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) placed a particularly high priority on the returns of 
refugees and IDPs to their pre-war homes, hoping that such returns would reverse the 
territorial, political and ethnic partition of the country. Annex 7, ‘’Agreement of Refugees and 
Displaced Persons’’, of the DPA consisted of a right in international law to return to one’s 
home country, also known as the process of repatriation (Heimerl 2006: 72). As article one 
declared:   
‘’All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. 
They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they have deprived in 
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the course of hostility since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be 
restored to them.’’ (Office of the High Representative 1995) 
In theory, Annex 7, is supposed to create a framework that would cease ethnic cleansing and 
bring the country back to its pre-war demographic status quo, which existed in 1991 (Heimerl 
2006: 72). This awkward division of power between the international community and local 
political institutions (Heimerl 2006: 72) has led to the separation of the municipalities, which 
was done with violence caused by political and territorial separation under the DPA. This was 
covertly intensified by DPA, which enabled the consolidation of these divisions during the first 
two years after the war (Heimerl 2006: 74). 
The international community assumed that most refugees and IDPs would voluntarily return 
to their original homes, however, not many refugees and IDPs had the same aspiration as 
them to return to their homes in the near future. Some people did not want to return at all. All 
returnees were plagued by the devastating economy, wartime property laws and depleted 
housing stuck. The returnees who would be a minority, would face discrimination, and be 
seen as the ‘other’ in a still tensed nationalist political environment (Heimerl 2006: 74) 
According to Heimerl (Heimerl 2006:74) the newly arrived returnees would get beaten, their 
houses would be taken over by the majority group, and they would lack of work or schooling 
opportunities. Furthermore, they would experience harassments within administrative and 
social services, their valid identity papers would be inaccessible, and they would have limited 
access of water and power utilities. Indeed, the political factors often played out in socio-
economic terms. While minority returnees were subjects to violence and intimidation, they 
were also victims of socio-economic discrimination at almost every level (ibid).  
 
Five years later in 2000, the international community had created the groundwork for large-
scale minority returns. The Human Rights Watch World Report from 2001 stressed the large-
scale minority returns as a ’’breakthrough in one of the most serious of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
human rights issues: the return of the refugees and displaced persons’’ (Human Rights Watch 
2001 cited in Heimerl 2006: 77). However, it took four years after the war to see significant 
levels of minority returns. For the first time after the signing of the DPA, refugees and IDPs 
returned in relatively large numbers to areas where they would be part of an ethnic minority 
(Heimerl 2006: 77).  
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It is important that people return to their homes after war so they can go back to pre-war 
status quo. In addition, people need to go back in order to contribute to the rebuilding of the 
country, and this includes work force to build up the economy of the country again.  
IDPs are important to understand BiH because many of them have fled from their original 
homes so they were not part of a minority who could be subject to harassment, so therefore 
many ended up in villages where they were considered a majority group and thereby harass 
other minority groups. This cycle would often result in conflicts and tensions in the society. 
The international community has so far not been fully successful in resolving this issue and 
therefore it is still present today.  
 
We choose to focus on this issue in the DPA because BiH was a multi-ethnic country where 
different ethnicities tolerated and coexisted each other. The DPA had actually strengthened 
the separation between the ethnicities, rather than to reconcile them. Just because there is no 
more war, it does not mean there is peace. Even 20 years after the international efforts to 
rebuild Bosnia, the country still stands on the edge of collapse. This is the first time since the 
signing of the DPA, that Bosnians again are discussing the potential for a new war (McMahon 
& Western 2009: 69). Even years after the end of the war, there are still a lot of refugees living 
abroad and high number of IDPs who have not been able to return to their homes. Only 
250,000 out of 2.1 million returned to their pre-war homes, and this was considered to be a 
clear indication of the failure of an improvement in human rights (PIC 1996 cited in Chandler 
2000: 105). Eight years later approximately one million people in total (438,000 refugees and 
547,000 IDPs) had returned mostly to their respective ethnic/religious group in places where 
they would be the majority. By the end of 2003, 434,000 refugees and IDPs out of one million 
had returned to their pre-war homes, however, where they would be part of the minority. 
This is less than 20 percent of the total number of refugees and IDPs given the 2.250,000 who 
were displaced during the conflict (Nowak 2004: 48). The following graphs illustrates the 
returns of refugees and IDPs, and minority and majority returns to pre-war residences.  
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Fig. 3. Majority and minority returns to pre-
war residences, 1996–2004 (to May 31, 2004).  
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Dahlman & Tuathail 2004: 440 & 444). 
 
To sum up, Bosnia is important, not only for the number of returnees and the inconsistencies  
of variations in responses throughout the entities and municipalities, but also due to the 
misapplied approach  by the international community to facilitate repatriation (Stefanovic & 
Loizides 2011: 412) 
Furthermore, BiH is one of the countries in Europe where there are three different ethnic 
governments who have to be represented in the presidency. Three ethnic groups and two 
nations in one country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Return of refugees and displaced 
persons to their pre-war residences, 1996–2004 
(to May 31, 2004) (UNHCR, various years). 
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The problem area enables to raise a research question, and thereby sub-questions.  
Research Question 
How were the refugee returnees & internally displaced persons handled by the 
international and national community, and to what extent was it successful in order to 
achieve the ideals of the Dayton Peace Agreement? 
In order to answer this research question fully we have set up these sub-questions: 
Who was in favour of the Dayton Peace Agreement and who was opposing it? 
How did the international community and the national community influence the return process 
of refugees & internally displaced persons? 
How did the international and national communities attribute to the successfulness or failure of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in relation to refugee returnees and internally displaced persons 
and why?  
 
Delimitation of Field of Research 
We are fully aware that the Dayton Peace Agreement is more than just about refugees and 
internally displaced person i.e. as stated in Annex 7. However, in order to fulfil the 
requirements of 30 pages we have to narrow down our scope to one focus area. The reason 
why we want to focus on the refugees and IDPs is that this humanitarian issue had a greater 
impact on the Bosnian peoples’ welfare given that it changed the country’s political stability 
along with its demography and socio-economy. These changes are still present today in 
Bosnia.  
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Chapter 2: The Method of the Project 
Methodology 
We are taking a methodological approach, which is content analysis and this will lead us to the 
causality. Content analysis is a highly flexible research method that has been widely used with 
varying research goals and objectives. The research method is applied in quantitative, 
qualitative, and for our case, mixed methods which includes both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Quantitative is using descriptive statistics in order tio investigate general patterns 
in the text while qualitative is using a hermeneutic reading (Castree, Kitchin & Rogers 
2013:76). Content analysis employs a wide range of analytical techniques to generate findings 
and put them into context. Content analysis is characterised as systematic, rigorous approach 
to analysing documents obtained or generated in the course of research (White & Marsh 
2006: 22). The analysis of the content analysis is conducted by systematically boiling down 
the text into component parts and coding them with respect to their content (Castree, Kitchin 
& Rogers 2013: 76). We will use relevant materials to describe, analyse and discuss whether 
the DPA was a success or failure while using them critically with the help from a chosen case 
study which will focus on refugees and internally displaced persons.  
We are trying to find the independent variables of why A causes B where A is the causality of 
factors behind B. B is a dependent variable that represents the results of low rates of refugee 
returnees and the significantly high rates of internally displaced persons. This following 
drawing illustrates the relationship between A and B:  
A?                                                B 
                    
Causality of factors behind B                        Results of low rates of returnees and high rates of 
IDPs 
The quantitative and qualitative methods are used, and they represent different research 
strategies (Bryman 2012: 37) and therefore our overall project is based on mixed methods. 
Quantitative methods entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research. It is also a research strategy, which emphasizes quantification in the collection and 
analysis of data. It embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality (Bryman 
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2012: 35-36). We are going to use this research method in order to collect numbers which we 
thereby can analyse the causality behind the numbers and to identify the factors behind the 
independent variables. For instance, the UNHCR recognized six municipalities out of 109 as 
‘Open Cities’ to welcome refugees back (Cox 1998: 625). With the help from quantitative data 
that stands out, we will be able to use qualitative method afterwards.   
Qualitative methods entails an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research. It rejects practices and norms of the natural scientific model and positivism. In 
addition, it emphasizes the ways in which individuals interpret their social world and 
embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ 
creation (Bryman 2012: 36). For instance, we are going to use this research method as it will 
show us the causality behind why people tend to stay away from their pre-war homes where 
they are considered as a minority due to security issues, such as job opportunities, 
discriminatory policies and poverty.  
 Use of Empirical Data/Methods 
The empirical data used in this project can be categorised into two types of sources: Academic 
books and journal articles. The sources are have a purpose, strengths and limitations. The 
origin of the history books and academic journal articles are mostly from Western historians 
such as America, Austria and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The purpose of history books is to provide 
explanations of the event and what was the outcome of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
regards to refugee returnees and internally displaced persons. The value of this choice of 
source is that they are thoroughly researched and many authors have wide access to wide 
range of sources and evidences. The books and articles have the benefit of hindsight, which 
means that they have the ability to understand after something has happened and can look 
back and see what should have been done, and what was the cause of the event.  However, no 
single books and journals has been used to provide a full account of events, because no one 
can have a full overview at this point.  
Our primary source derives from the official document of the Dayton Peace Agreement. We 
will be citing the source when we want to state exact sentences to show what they Dayton 
Peace Agreement is explicitly telling.  Our secondary sources are only based on secondary 
sources i.e. books and academic journal article. They have a greater ability to see turning 
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points and outcome of the Dayton Peace Agreement due to the benefit of hindsight since the 
sources are published years after the ethnic cleansing occurred. We can be sure to use books 
and journal articles as secondary sources. 
Selection of Theory  
There can be several factors behind why people want to return to BiH or stay away from their 
original homes. The research on ethnic violence highlighted the importance of security 
concerns and trustworthy safeguards in conflict situations (Van Evera 1994 cited in 
Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 419).  Vulnerable Bosnians including elderly, women whose male 
family members were killed and families with small children, are more likely to be scared to 
return to a potentially unstable environment (Belloni 2007: 170 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 
2011: 419). Simultaneously, these vulnerable groups pose fewer threats and therefore these 
are more likely to be tolerated in ‘rival’ communities (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 419). This 
vulnerability can be enhanced by personal traumatic experiences such as  assault, torture, loss 
of a close friend or family member (UNHCR 2005: 3), or repeated and severe ethnic 
harassment after the war like stoning of buses carrying returnees, rioting, looting, and 
burning residential property (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 419).  
According to the DPA, the returnees have the right to return home peacefully, however, the 
local security level and the village’s geographic position can increase the vulnerability. 
Villages surrounded by other ethnic groups are more likely to be attacked than villages 
surrounded by the same ethnic group. Also the victims’ sense of security risk tends to increase 
whenever municipal governments are controlled by ultra-nationalist parties and in the 
presence of alleged war criminals (Nalepa 2007 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 420). The 
intense fighting between municipalities and local revenge throughout the war also increased 
fears of renewed ethnic violence (ICG 1999: 7-8 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 420). On 
the other hand, there are also contextual external factors that appeared to have decreased the 
fears of physical attack in Bosnian refugees like the arrests of alleged war criminals, the 
presence of international troops and the multi-ethnic composition of the local police force 
(ICG 2002: 26). Studies have shown that incentives are a powerful tool in turning the conflict 
around to cooperation, and this insight is important to look at in the study of return 
(Dorussen 2001:251 cited in Stefanovic and Loizides 2011:421). From the perspective of the 
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Rational Choice Theory, calculations of potential benefits and costs of return should have had 
an influence in decision-making process of ordinary Bosnians. The Rational Choice Theory 
assumes that people are motivated by money and self-interest in making a profit, and this has 
constructed predictive models of human behaviour (Scott 1999: 126) 
In the perceived economic benefits of return, factors include the value of the property, the 
perception of economic opportunities, and concerns about the loss of refugee benefits, 
pensions, and health coverage due to existing regulations in the place of return (Opacic 2005: 
68 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 420). IDPs with more resources are more likely to 
return (Holtzman & Nezam 2004 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 420), even though the 
cost can be more expensive for the potential returnees who have jobs and permanent 
accommodation in the new place of residence. In some cases, however, Bosnians returnees 
keep jobs in other Bosnian entity and commute daily across IEBL (Belloni 2007 cited in 
Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 420).  
Research by Roger Petersen and Pal Kolsto indicated that living as part of a minority under 
the domination of a particular ethnic group perceived as inferior may be humiliating, while 
the majority ethnic domination seen as superior might be seen as legitimate (Petersen 2002: 
2-4 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 424).  
Another theory that could be interesting to use is the intergroup contact theory, however, we 
will not go in depth with it. In the intergroup contact theory, resentment considerations are 
important in designing policies for refugee return (Gordon Allport 1954 cited in Stefanovic & 
Loizides 2011: 424). Allport argued that under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact 
is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group 
members (ibid). Then the question is whether returnees will be better off integrated or left to 
return in smaller territories under their exclusive control if they were under conditions of 
perceived resentment (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 424). Furthermore, the resentment thesis 
indicates that victims of ethnic cleansing, who believe that the group which now dominates 
their region is inferior, are less likely to in the first place return, and, if they manage to return, 
more likely to remain segregated (ibid).  
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The Way Ahead 
The principal architect Richard Holbrooke stated that: “Dayton was not the creation of two 
different countries inside Bosnia. […] This is going to be one country. If it isn’t, then we will 
have failed” (quoted in Rosenfeld, 1995, p. A27) (Dahlman & Tuathail 2004: 441). Based on 
this quote we will discuss whether the international and local intervention attributed to the 
successfulness or failure of the DPA, in relation to refugees and IDP returnees.  
In order to see the DPA as a success or failure it will be shown through the expected number 
of people returning back to their homes. The expected range of returnees was between 
140,000 and 200,000. However, it did not even exceed 110,000 (Keane 2002: 89). Just by 
numerical data we are enabled to identity the factors behind the low rates of returnees and 
high rates of IDPs. We have divided the project into three steps where the first step is a 
description, second step is the analytical part and third step is the discussion part. The first 
sub-question is a description of the DPA and its actors involved. This helps us to answer the 
research question because it can influence the design of the DPA and its expectations. It is 
addressed in chapter 3. Our second sub-questions is the analytical part, which is addressed in 
chapter 4, and our third sub-question is the discussion part, in chapter 5, where we assess the 
internal factors behind the DPA’s successfulness or failure. 
State of the Art 
The literature chosen in this research served the purposes of  
 Explaining the Dayton Peace Agreement and its effect on the Bosnian peacebuilding 
 Analyzing and understanding the role of the international and national community in 
Bosnia during the war and post-war 
 Assessing whether the international and national communities served their purposes 
based on the Dayton Peace Agreement and if it was successful or not. 
 In response to this, it is important for us to choose our authors wisely and specifically choose 
those who have written extensively on this field of research. They are: Carl Dahlman, Gearóid 
Tuathail, Djordje Stefanovic, Neophytos Loizides and David Chandler. We will focus on two 
sources, the first being a journal and the second being a book. We will start by describing the 
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content and focus of the source, hereafter its usefulness to our research and lastly write an 
evaluation of its reliability.  
The first source is a journal from 2011 by Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides called 
“The Way Home: Peaceful Return of Victims of Ethnic Cleansing”. The main theme is refugees 
and internally displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the journal does 
comparisons with Cyprus who had experienced similar ethnic cleansing. The main points of 
this journal is the negotiation of the right to return and how it was implemented in post-
conflict societies. It focuses on the difficulty of voluntarily returning and the identification of 
conditions under which refugees and internally displaced persons have to take consideration 
whether or not they decide to return in spite of the resistance from new occupants and local 
authorities. The journal introduces a theoretical framework along with the security issue and 
the inter-personal contact (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011).  
The advantage of the source is that it offers some theoretical explanations of why people will 
and will not return, however they are not in depth. They also recognize their own limitation to 
their analysis. In addition, it is also similar to other sources we have read, because they point 
out the similar things, which can strengthen the arguments. The disadvantage of the source is 
that they also focus on Cyprus as well, whereas we only want to focus on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Therefore, some of the content is not necessarily useful for our focus. The 
journal is useful to our analytical part because we have to access how the international 
organisations encouraged the refugee returnees to return and internally displaced persons to 
reintegrate in the civil society.  
The authors of this journal are reliable and trustworthy because of their academic 
background. Stefanovic has a background in ethnic and racial studies, Europe-Asian studies, 
and European history, and Loizides has a background in peace research, international studies 
perspectives, nationalities papers, nations and nationalism, cooperation and conflict, Middle 
Eastern studies and parliamentary affairs (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011). This makes the 
journal trustworthy and reliable for us to use in our project.  
The second source is a book from 2006 by David Chandler called ‘’Peace Without Politics’’. 
The main theme of this book is peacebuilding and state-building ten years after the peace 
settlement in Bosnia. The main points in the book is the focus on the aftermath of the war, 
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especially the ten years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to the 
book, every aspect and form of the political and socio-economic environment in Bosnia is 
shaped by the legacy of the war. This is accentuated by the fact that Bosnia, still to this day, is 
under international control with the Office of the International High Representative (OHR) 
frequently using its powers to reject elected presidents, prime ministers, and MPs (Chandler 
2006).  
The advantage of this source is that is has a wide perspective on the war, covering several 
issues relevant for our project such as the security dilemma, the peacebuilding at local, 
national and international level, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and 
others. In addition, it also gives good descriptions and explanations of why and how things did 
and did not happen, while remaining analytical. We have assessed this book as being one of 
our main sources for our project, because of the usefulness of the different chapters’ content 
in relation to our research question. However, the disadvantage of this book is that some of 
the chapters are not particularly useful for our focus, e.g. the chapter ‘’From Dayton to 
Europe’’ that focuses on Bosnia’s wish for joining the EU, rather than our focus, which is the 
refugees and internally displaced persons and the success of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  
The book is reliable and trustworthy because the different authors for each chapter including 
Chandler all have an academic background within the field of politics and international 
relations. Their academic background are specified in the pages ‘Notes on Contributors’ 
(Chandler 2006), where most of them are acknowledged professors and researchers.  
The authors in this book that we have used all have different research methods, e.g. Roberto 
Belloni who is using the municipality Prijedor as a case study, while Gemma Collantes Celador 
has a specific focus group, the police, in which she bases her research on. Lastly, we have 
Daniela Heimerl who is using statistics to analyse the refugees and IDPs, and their return 
movements.  
Furthermore, this book is a ‘’volume published as a special issue of the journal International 
Peacekeeping’’ (Chandler 2006), which shows that this book is a part of an even bigger 
research. Peace without Politics is published by the publisher ‘Taylor & Francis Group Ltd’’. 
Taylor & Francis Group Ltd is considered reliable because of their launch of academic books, 
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journals, eBooks, textbooks etc.,1 often used as teaching material. Nevertheless, the book is 
relevant and useable – especially in the analytical and evaluating part where we will address 
the international community’s influence on the return issue, the peoples attempt to 
reintegrate and whether the Dayton Peace Agreement was a success or a failure. However, we 
have also used it for our introduction, which proves the book’s relevance in almost the whole 
project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 http://www.taylorandfrancis.com/  
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Chapter 3: The DPA - Its advocators and opponents 
 
In this descriptive chapter, we aim to answer our first sub-question which is; Who was in 
favour of the Dayton Peace Agreement and who was opposing it? We will do this by explaining 
the DPA itself and who exactly was in favour and against the agreement. 
The leaders of the three national governments of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia signed the 
principal articles of the DPA. Officially, the signing of this agreement took place in Paris on 
December 1995. This agreement meant that Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia had to recognise each 
other as sovereign states and had to stop the armed conflict against each other (Keane 2002: 
72). They also included that they had to accept boundaries between the Federation of BiH and 
Republika Srpska (RS), sign commissions on human rights, refugees and IDPs, and investigate 
and prosecute war crimes and human rights violation (ibid). 
The presence and threat of NATO armed forces enforced their own set of rules of the DPA. The 
US encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to go for independence and by that, the Bosnian Muslims 
were dependent on the US. In order for democracy to take place in Bosnia, the population of 
BiH must perceive the DPA as an important step towards peace and justice. However, there 
are many issues arising out of the DPA that can be conceived as unjust (Keane 2002: 72). The 
Bosnian Serbs viewed the DPA as giving them the part of Bosnia that they had fought for. They 
were dependent on the US in order to halt the Croatian and Muslim offensives.  
 The Bosnian Muslims saw the objectives of the DPA with suspicion, pessimism and in some 
cases with a deep sense of injustice. Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim President of Bosnia, 
expressed these feelings clearly in his first public response to the successful conclusion of the 
Dayton negotiations (Holbrooke 1998: 311-312 cited in Keane 2002: 70): 
‘’And to my people, I say, this may not be a just peace, but it is more just than a continuation of 
war. In the situation as it is and in the world as it is, a better peace could not have been 
achieved. God is our witness that we have done everything in our power so that the extent of 
injustice for our people and our country will be decreased.’’ 
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From the perspective of a Bosnian Muslim, there were two severe issues of injustice. The war 
crimes committed against the Muslim population, mostly by Serbs and Bosnian Serbs, have 
not been addressed or even acknowledged by the international community. The present 
generations of Bosnian Muslims cannot forget the massacres, gross human rights abuses and 
ethnic cleansing that occurred in Srebrenica and Prijedor, and the failure from the 
international community to prevent these atrocities. (ibid). The second major issue of 
injustice to the Bosnian Muslims population is the fact that the DPA settlement gave off 49 
percent of the territory to the Bosnian Serbs and 51 percent to both Croats and Bosnian 
federation (Keane 2002: 73). Muslims and Croat felt that they had lost the war, since RS got 49 
percent of the land and entity status (Keane 2002: 77) The two entities was separated by a 
pseudo-border called the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).  
The unevenly distribution of this settlement can be shown in statistics of the pre-war 
population. In 1991 Yugoslav census of population showed that there were 43.7% Muslims, 
31.4 % Serb, 17.3% Croat, 5.5% Yugoslav and 2.1% other (Keane 2002: 77). By taking the 
census population from 1991, the division would be considered more just or equitable. From 
the figures, it could be seen as it is the Bosnian Serbs who had ‘won the war’. However, one 
needs to remember is that around 90,000 Bosnian Serbs were killed in the war and many 
have been ethnically cleansed from Muslim and Croat (ibid). The Serbs in RS mourned, as they 
had lost Sarajevo, and in addition, Serbs were continually fleeing the Federation, in fear of 
both Muslim/Croat and Serb aggression (Keane 2002: 76). The Croats carried out some of the 
worst atrocities in the war. For instance, Croat forces in the village of Ahmici in Central Bosnia 
(Allock 1998: 2) massacred over 100 Muslim villages. Nevertheless, some Croats within BiH 
felt disappointed, as they did not gain entity status like the Bosnian Serbs did. Franjo 
Tudjman, the President of Croatia, was willing to impose a settlement on the Bosnian Croats 
which meant that they had to co-operate with the Bosnian Muslim government and support 
for the Muslim-Croat Federation in order to stop offensives against the Croatian Serbs 
(Chandler 2000: 43) 
The system of government imposed by the DPA effectively diminished the power and 
responsibilities of central government. The Contact Group, which consisted of France, Russia, 
United Kingdom, Germany and the United States, proposed a confederal BiH compromised of 
a Muslim-Croat federation and a Serb republic as self-governing entities within a single 
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country with a weak central government (Caplan 2000: 216). However, this lack of central 
government can allow the national assembly in RS to take on nation state status, and thereby 
alienating the Muslims and Croats living in, or wishing to return, to the entity (Keane 2002: 
73). Given that there is no cantonal level of governance in the RS, there is indeed a real threat 
that the Serb dominated assembly had alienated the Muslim and Croat minorities (ibid). The 
Serbs favoured the DPA because they did not have to compromise with other groups thereby 
having the ultimate power, unlike the Bosnians and Croats who had to share an entity and 
negotiate with each other.  
 
In this chapter, we found out that the DPA was meant to stop the war and rebuild the peace 
process between the three ethnic groups. However, the Serbs certainly benefitted from the 
agreement since they got the most territory and thereby more power within the country.  
On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were not so pleased and according to the 
Bosnian Muslims this was considered unjust because they felt that they had already suffered 
enough in terms of the loss of civilians lives and being subjects to other war crimes.  
In relation to the Rational Choice Theory the three big ethnic groups’ representatives behaved 
or reacted in a certain way so that they could benefit for their own respective group, and this 
theory can help us to explain why they behaved the way they did. For instance, the Serbian 
President Milosovic was in favour and thereby a supporter of the DPA because they would get 
49 percent of the territory according to the DPA. The Bosnian Muslims were not contempt of 
the agreement because that would mean that they would lose their full territory and the 
Croats were not satisfied either because they wanted to stop the attacks from the Croatian 
Serbs.         
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Chapter 4: The international and national intervention in BiH 
In this analytical chapter, we will explore the following sub-question; How did the 
international community and the national community influence the return process of refugees & 
internally displaced persons? In order to answer this, we will look at the security issue, the 
ethnic division, the return process, and the implemented programmes by the international 
community along with the national authorities’ response to these programmes.  
According to Article I (2), the Bosnian Parties shall “ensure that the refugees and displaced 
persons are permitted to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, 
persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, 
or political opinion” (Nowak 2004: 47). Bosnian officials were advised ‘’to promote and 
encourage the activities of the non-governmental and international organisations for the 
protection and promotion of human rights’’ (Article XIII, par. 1 cited in Chandler 2000: 48). 
Although, the DPA ended the war, it did not end the conflict. The agreement guaranteed 
refugees and IDPs the right to return to their original homes; however, it also divided Bosnia 
into ethno-nationalists territories. This division resulted a massive displacement issue, with 
more than half the country’s population fleeing from their homes because of ethnic cleansing. 
The initial security dilemma for the international community was to keep the peace, however, 
they soon faced another security issue created by the refugees and displaced persons 
themselves as these started to act in their right to return home in what had become hostile 
ethno-nationalist entities (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 569). The ethnic map of BiH in the 
following depiction shows a diversity in the ethnic mix in pre-war 1992, with only 27 
communes having ethnic majorities of more than 75 percent (Statisticki godisnjak Republike 
Bosne i Hercegovine 1992: 298-301 cited in Allock 2004: 27). Nevertheless, after the war, 
local communes were evidently segregated spatially along the ethnic border lines, despite 
that as diverse as their ethnic composition may have been.  
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Source from OHR in: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13564139. Accessed 20/11-14. 
When the international authority implemented the DPA, the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) in 1997 gave OHR more power thereby approving the High Representative to introduce 
laws and to assure that protections between the entities were in compliance with the peace 
plan (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 586). The OHR has the ultimate authority in regards to the 
DPA, and this includes the power to declare whether particular policies of the parties were in 
compliance (ibid). The OHR also received the power to interfere and remove obstruct officials 
who were not fulfilling the ideals and criteria of the DPA, especially in regards to protecting 
Bosnian returnees and prosecuting evictions (ibid). The international community had the 
return of refugees and IDPs as a main priority, and the numbers of returnees have been 
commonly used as an index of democracy and human rights (OHRB 1997 cited in Chandler 
2000: 104). International policy was implemented on the expectation that most of IDPs would 
like to return if human rights were respected and democratic values became into force. When 
people expressed the wish not return, it was not because they absolutely not wanted to return 
home but merely because of the indicative of systematic intimidation and manipulation by 
nationalist parties (ICG 1998: 11 cited in Chandler 2000: 104).  
In order to have a successful minority return programme, the international agency had to 
identify a local community where its authorities were willing to accept the return of 
minorities. As a result, the UNHCR implemented the Open Cities in 1997, which gave the local 
authorities to declare themselves publicly to be open to minority return, and in return, they 
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would have the possibility of receiving increased levels of reconstruction aid and other 
economic assistance. Economic conditionality is the best-articulated concept to illustrate this 
example (Cox 1998: 625). The majority of agencies engaged in reconstruction that targeted 
for minorities to adopt a ‘one for one’ policy, whereby an equal number of houses were 
reconstructed for the benefit of the majority group. This would help to minimize the local 
opposition to return. In 1997, the UNHCR had recognized six municipalities out of 109 as 
Open Cities (ibid). The current ethnic groups that now controlled the area had also pre-war 
majority group in each of the return area. In these cases, the local authorities were less 
threatened by the view of returnees as a challenge to territorial control. In the numbers of 
returning ethnic group were enormous, then the local authorities would be reluctant to allow 
even small numbers of them due to the fear of a larger-scale return movement. Therefore, the 
small numbers of returns had to go quietly or otherwise it would be jeopardized if the return 
became too public (ibid).  
During the early post-war phase 1995-99, all attempts to facilitate returns where either half-
hearted or unsuccessful, and were met with strong resistance by ultra-nationalists (Stefanovic 
& Loizides 2011: 422). The ultra-nationalists adopted a set of policies with objectives to 
solidify ethnic cleansing by refusing to implement property laws, encouraging riots against 
returnees, having systematic discrimination in the judicial system and employment, and 
promoting ethnically intolerant school curricula (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005 cited in Stefanovic 
& Loizides 2011: 422). Given this resistance, and the concerns that the involvement of 
international troops in the return process might embroil them in renewed violence, many 
NATO commanders insisted that they had no mandate to protect returnees from violence 
(Belloni 2007 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 422). As a result, expensive programmes, 
such as the Open Cities initiative that was aimed at providing economic incentives for 
municipalities that welcomed returnees, produced few returns (ICG 1998 cited in Stefanovic 
& Loizides). By January 1999, when only 86,741 of the total number of minorities have 
returned as disappointment with the return rates and donor fatigue set in, Bosnia seemed 
destined to repeat the failure of many other post-conflict societies to reverse ethnic cleansing 
(ICG cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 422). However, in the same year the international 
organisations desired and were able to break the resistance to returns. The Office of High 
Representatives in BiH (OHRB) presented a set of laws to facilitate the repossession of the 
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refugees and IDPs property. This shift in the approach, changed the perspective of the issue of 
returns from a heavily politicised policy of economic aid to municipalities in exchange of 
minimum tolerance to the minorities, into an ethnically-blind exercise of property rights for 
the individual  and rule of law (ICG: 23 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). The 
Constitutional Court along with the participation of foreign judges actively promoted a re-
integration of refugees and IDPs by deciding in 2000 that the federal entities could not be 
considered entirely Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim. Rather, they must instead guarantee legal 
equality to all citizens including the returns of minorities (Belloni 2008: 58-62 cited in 
Loizides & Antoniades 2009: 614).  
To promote a higher level of returnees, especially minority returnees and second phase 
returns2 the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), a specialised agency with a set of 
field offices, was established in 1997 under the chairmanship and demand of the OHR (Keane 
2002: 90). The RRTF worked cross BiH with a counterpart in Croatia. The intention and aim of 
the RRTF was to facilitate and handle the return process at the local level (ICG cited in 
Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). Furthermore, to impose an intensive plan to focus on the 
issue of space so it could bring people to return, to develop security for the individual 
returnees and to develop the sustainability, which makes it likely for returnees to build and 
improve a future in their original hometowns (Keane 2002: 90). This included the promotion 
of returns from Western Europe. The international community strengthened the continuance 
of ethnic-cleansing policies by pressuring refugees to go back to their country based on the 
misapplied policy of an ‘internal flight alternative’ which was used by Germany other 
European countries which meant that they were forced the Bosnian refugees to find a new 
residence in a majority area and the become IDPs (Nowak 2004: 46-47). 
The UNCHR have compromised with Western European countries to host temporary 
protection for huge numbers of displaced person who needed urgent security. As a 
consequence, it cannot be certain that the States would have an obligation to offer a more 
longer-lasting status to the refugees, while awaiting the possibility of minority return on a 
large scale (Cox 1998: 619). In 1996, Germany hosted half a million Bosnian refugees and 
began to put reasonable pressure on the UNHCR to contrive a repatriation plan (Bagshaw 
                                                          
2
 ”Second Phase Returns” refers to where return of people to their pre-war home, involves the eviction of peoples of 
different ethnicity, who moved into that accommodation during or after the war. It is the most sensitive form of 
return, but necessary if ethnic cleansing is to be reversed.  
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1997 cited in Belloni 2006: 133). This means that Bosnian refugees had to be send back. 
Between 1996 and 1998 approximately 150,000 were repatriated (Belloni 2006: 133) and the 
international authorities did not contribute enough to facilitate their return home (ibid). 
Some of the immense practical problems that UNHCR faced was to carry out the repatriation 
in an orderly manner. They lacked the means to return the large-scale refugees to areas where 
they would now be in the ethnic minority, the UNHCR had no choice than to facilitate internal 
relocation. The lead agency of the internal community for refugee matters may forcibly accept 
the reality of ethnic separation and began to implement programmes, which would complete 
the process of ethnic cleansing (Cox 1998: 619-620). The repatriation of refugees had added 
more on to the ethnic homogenization of BiH (Heimerl 2006 cited in Belloni 2006: 133). 
Simultaneously, international agencies were reluctant to permanently relocate the Bosnian 
IDPs due to the fear that this would legitimate wartime ethnic cleansing. As a result, the 
proclamation of the right to return home, incorporated with a lack of enforcement and the 
international reluctance to relocation, produced the worst possible outcome: it undermined 
the goals of the DPA of reversing ethnic cleansing, while leaving many Bosnian in an 
indeterminate and likely unsustainable state of international displacement (Belloni 2006: 
133). Through this, some European countries contributed to the ethnic/religious partition of 
BiH along with the efforts of the nationalist parties after post-war (Nowak 2004: 47). 
Figures from the UNHCR reveal a total of 454,220 minority returns across BiH, and they 
reveal the number of majority and minority returns exceeding approximately one million 
persons (Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1047). The temporal distribution of all returns, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1, is the result of an wave of returning refugees between the years of 
1996 and 1999 as they were repatriated by neighbouring European countries, such as the 
earlier mentioned Germany who repatriated a large number refugees. These returns was not 
necessarily to original communities but to housing in separated and restricted ethno-spaces, 
which often meant taking over another person’s property, thus blocking potential internal 
returns (ibid). The following figure, which is divided into two graphs, illustrates minority 
returns by year and entity and yearly trends in minority returns, refugees and IDPs. 
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Source: (UNHCR 2005 cited in Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1048).  
The UNCHR and the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Returns has continued to 
produce figures that illustrates the returns and has continued to help regulate sustainable 
return initiatives supported by international donors. However, within the UNCHR and many 
other organisations, there is an acknowledgement that the figures for official minority 
returns, in a large extent, are misleading (Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1049). 
However, the RRTF also pushed to get rid of all the obstacles and difficulties that would 
prevent the returning process, such as the legislation and administration, and switched it out 
with the establishment of property and housing legislation, and other legislation that would 
be crucial for the development in minority return (Keane 2002: 90). The success of RRTF is 
illustrated in figures from a period between January-March month in 1999 where there were 
1116 minority returns compared to only 673 in the same period the previous year (ibid). The 
OHR estimated that the number of minority returns for 1999 would be around 120,000; 
however, the figures are inaccessible (ibid).   
 Spontaneous returns became a big trouble for the international community, since they were 
not equipped to protect the returnees for fear that ‘taking sides’ by forcing the local 
nationalist authorities to hand over exclusive control over their territory, would result in 
revived fighting  where IFOR would be in the middle (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 582). The 
international community’s uncertainty over how to handle with returns emanated from a 
contradiction in the DPA between the partition of BiH into de facto mono-ethnic spaces, and 
the peace plan’s assurance that the displaced could return to their original homes before the 
war (ibid). As OHR in charge, international agencies showed a new resolve in counteracting 
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violent reluctance to minority returns. In 1997, the OHR had formerly established RRTF as a 
forum for coordination and as a management mechanism spearheading returns at the local 
level (Heimerl 2006: 75). The focal points of the internationals on the right of return, and the 
right to franchise in citizens’ municipality of where they had lived in 1991, had provoked the 
ethnical homogeneity of the entities (ibid).  
In addition, the OHR was given the power, from the international community, to remove 
officials who they were sure did not fulfil DPA’s responsibilities and commitments. This 
included the right of return (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 650 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 
2011: 423). Especially ultra-nationalists mayors who tried to obstruct the repossession of 
property were to be dismissed by the OHR (ICG: 15 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). 
Furthermore, the international community presented a Property Law Implementation Plan, 
which would allow forced evictions of persons who were illegally occupying refugees’ 
property (Belloni 2007: 186-88 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). Lastly, international 
troops began to show greater desire and willingness when providing physical security for the 
returnees (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 651 cited in Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). The 
outcome was a success, to numerous international administrators’ surprise (ICG cited in 
Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423). Minority returns in several municipalities immediately 
increased with 30 percent from their pre-war presence (Dahlman & Tuathail 2006: 12 cited in 
Stefanovic & Loizides 2011: 423).  
Changes in the international governance, also known as reconstructions, implemented several 
policies, in support of returnees, to promote the returns (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 569). 
This included the protection of civilians during the fighting, assuring humanitarian necessities 
would be delivered, the management of bringing refugees and IDPs to safety, the 
establishment of safe havens for these, the arrangement of temporary protection status 
elsewhere overseas, and programmes of reconstruction and returns (Cox 1998: 602). Due to 
the practical and legal difficulties associated with gaining possession of occupied properties, 
minority return programmes devised by the international community operated by identifying 
housing which was uninhabited because of the war damage, and locating the original owners 
and repairing the properties for their benefit (Cox 2008: 624). These programmes were 
resource intensive and feasible only in limited circumstances (Cox 2008: 625), and included: 
“shelter programmes, employment creation, human rights programmes, lobbying reform of 
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property laws, blacklisting municipalities and economic conditionality and recently the 
UNHCR Open Cities initiative” (Cox 1998: 623). In addition, programmes that concentrated on 
minority returnees to elect officials to their pre-war districts were implemented (Keane 2002: 
92). If the minorities elect representative officials in their pre-war district, others will find it 
much easier to return home, especially knowing that they have political representatives.  
The idea behind the programmes was to provide a catalyst to encourage further returns. It 
was hoped that there would be a domino effect when once a certain number of returns have 
been successful, other families may be encouraged to return to the area by their own devices 
(Cox 2008: 626). However, there was no significant sign that the minority return programmes 
in selected localities provided a catalyst for returns in other area where the condition were 
may be different in the local political, socio-and economic level (ibid). Even the success of the 
Open Cities and other minority return programmes were above the actual expectations, they 
were more likely to have reached a natural ceiling in the number of returns that can be 
achieved (ibid). There were still areas who have been against the return and proved to be 
resistant to influence through economic conditionality, and may remained ignored and 
untouched by the Open Cities initiative (ibid). The return of minorities in 1998 might have 
been a symbolic breakthrough that launched the start of a slow ethnic reintegration; however, 
it is unlikely to work out the displacement problem (ibid). Despite the intensive efforts, return 
programmes of this sort can have a minimal impact on the situation of the displaced (Cox 
2008: 627).  
In this chapter, we found out that the international community saw the return process of 
refugees and IDPs as a humanitarian crisis and therefore they did not interfere in national 
affairs, which meant that they did not provide a special protection especially for the minority 
returnees. This resulted in low rates of returnees. The international community implemented 
programmes to ease the repatriation and return process as a short-term solution whereas 
they expected the national authority to handle the long term issue, for example, the re-
integration of returnees into the societies, the protection of these, and welcoming them. 
However, they were reluctant to obey the international community’s proposals, thereby 
alienating especially the minority returnees. According to the Rational Choice Theory, the 
international community handled the post-war crisis as means of “humanitarian crisis” and 
therefore not interfering the internal affairs because that could worsen the conflict thereby 
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the international community would not lose their face. The host States felt the huge burden of 
large numbers of refugees and this could have affected the host State’s own welfare. As a 
consequence, the host States forced the refugees to repatriate to BiH.  The nationalists were 
reluctant to most of the implemented programmes in order to pursue their own 
discriminatory policies, which would scare off the minority returnees. In order to understand 
the outcomes behind one’s actions we need to go more in depth with the causalities behind 
the figures and the evaluation of the provisions of Dayton Peace Agreement.  
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Chapter 5: The success and failure of the DPA 
 
In this chapter, we aim to discuss our third sub-question; How did the international and 
national communities attribute to the successfulness or failure of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
relation to refugee returnees and internally displaced persons and why? This will be answered 
by discussing how the international community’s and as well as the nationalists’ involvement 
impacted the success and failure of the DPA and how come.  
 
Robert Belloni, a Professor in International Relations, stated: ‘’The higher international and 
local capacity, and the lower war-related hostilities, the more likely peacebuilding will be 
successful’’ (Belloni 2006: 131). Peacebuilding scholars argue that there are two key elements 
when explaining progress, and when explaining the lack off process, in peacebuilding after a 
war: the country’s local capacity and the level of international assistance (Belloni 2006: 131).   
The principal architect Richard Holbrooke stated that: “Dayton was not the creation of two 
different countries inside Bosnia. […] This is going to be one country. If it isn’t, then we will 
have failed” (quoted in Rosenfeld, 1995, p. A27) (Dahlman & Tuathail 2004: 441). Based on 
this quote we will discuss whether the international and local intervention attributed to the 
successfulness or failure of the DPA, in relation to refugees and IDP returnees.  
The International Attribution to the Success and Failure 
There were noticeable obstacles that hindered the minority return of refugees and IDPs: lack 
of security and freedom movements, the hostile and discriminatory attitude of politicians and 
the majority population towards ethnic minority returnees, the large-scale destruction of 
houses, apartments and infrastructure as a response for the systematic policies of ethnic 
cleansing. The occupation of habitable homes by other people who usually belonged to the 
ethnic/religious majority community based on abandoned property-legislation and so forth 
(Nowak 2004: 49). One can argue that the failure of the international community’s role in 
Bosnia was because of political unwillingness from the leaders of important key powers, such 
as Germany, to act above a ‘humanitarian’ reading of the war (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 579). 
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In a humanitarian perspective, there were no enemies only victims; for Bosnia’s ethno-
nationalist, civilians were the enemy (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 578).  
Real Property Claims from the Annex 7 and the priority on the implementation of the new 
property legislation by the international community can be seen as successful of the peace-
building process (Nowak 2004: 50). This was successful as above 92 percent of all claims of 
repossession of real property (or more than 200,000 claims) have been reclaimed (Norwegian 
Refugee Council 2004 cited in Heimerl 2006: 80). For example in some municipalities in RS, 
around 95 percent of property claims have been worked out, however only approximately 10 
percent of Bosnian refugees and IDPs have in fact returned to these residences  (Nowak 2004: 
49). This implicated that the IDP category were getting smaller – not just, because IDPs are 
returning to their original homes but also because their pre-war property is being reinstated 
thereby losing their IDP status. Yet, what is more concerning in this case is that those who do 
return are typically the poorest and most socially vulnerable. Thus, people who have no other 
options but to return. Still, without great socio-economic changes, the elderly and vulnerable 
returnees will be without reasonable support, often in isolated enclaves without enough 
social support networks, either public or private (Heimerl 2006: 80).  
Minority returnees often live in isolated rural areas, and a high percentage of returnees 
consists of elderly and retired persons who returned in order to live out their lives in pre-war 
familiar surroundings. Many of the elderly return because of strong emotional connections to 
their land, however, returns are much less attractive for younger people as they are more 
concerned about their economic future (Heimerl 2006: 79). However, a noticeable amount of 
Bosnian citizens who statistically counted as minority return only returned for a brief period 
in order to formally repossess their pre-war homes, but exclusively to sell them and so they 
could resettle in a majority area (Nowak 2004: 49). This means that although the 
international community succeeded in getting the owners their repossessed property back, it 
can still be seen as a failure since the purpose was to relocate to a majority area.    
Despite great international efforts to promote returns, getting people physically back to their 
original homes is only half the task of re-creating a functioning multi-ethnic state (Heimerl 
2006: 78). The other half includes promoting conditions in which minority returnees can 
survive and reintegrate themselves into their respective old/new communities (Heimerl 
2006: 78). However, a new issue arose among the demography:  
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       “Those who have returned permanently tend to be older and in rural areas where they 
depend upon agriculture. Many young IDPs have remained in their place of displacement 
seeking education, social and economic opportunities that are scarcer in their communities of 
origin. The trend seems to be that people are remaining in (and moving to) areas where they 
can live amongst their own ethnic group.” (UNHCR 2007 cited in Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 
1049-1050).  
Returnees were not only concerned about which ethno-ethnic group they would live amongst, 
but they were concerned about facing poverty and unemployment along with an insecure 
future (Dahlman & Tuathail 2004: 460). Limited resources for returnees, unequal distribution 
of economic opportunities and ambiguous sustainability of return communities were factors 
of why people either remained in their respective old communities or moved to new 
communities (Dahlman & Tuathail 2004:  459).  It was important for returnees to live in 
communities where they would be part of the majority group, as this would assure them a 
more secure future. In a socioeconomic context, minority returns felt necessity for economic 
support. With the absence of it, many families would not have the resources to return and 
rebuild their former properties. Not all of those wishing to return could get funding. 
Furthermore, some families had to be displaced in locations that had better economic 
conditions than their home areas. Some did not wanted to risk returning to areas where vital 
sources of local employment were in the hands of wartime profiteers and political figures 
(Tuathail and Dahlman 2004 cited in Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1048).  
However, the position of the international administration did not naturally tie in with Bosnian 
needs.  There was not much evidence to prove the fact that the majority of people who had 
not returned to their original homes even wished to return, and there was even less evidence 
that returns supported by the international community and other imposed return initiatives 
helped the long-term resettlement. By the year 1998, this resulted into the majority of IDPs 
and refugees being in need of settlement as the areas they were originally where now areas 
they were they would be a part of the minority (Chandler 2000: 108). Certainly, prior to 1998, 
the majority of minority returns were ‘’individual, voluntary and spontaneous’’ as stated by 
the RRTF (RRTF 1997a: par. 2.1 cited in Chandler 2000: 108). These types of returns created a 
dilemma for the international community, as they were not prepared to protect the returnees 
because of the fear that ‘taking sides’ would force the local nationalists to cede exclusive 
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control over their territory thereby resulting in renewed fights. The international community 
blamed the refugees and IDPs for returning to the pre-war homes, along with those who 
encouraged them to return as it was ‘too rapidly’. This resulted in violence, which again was 
blamed on these, and not the actual perpetrators (Belloni 2006: 136). This also shows that 
high profile organised repatriation plans by the international community ‘’made up for only a 
minor proportion of return movements’’ (OHRR 1996d: par. 51 cited in Chandler 2000: 108).  
There are several reasons for the failure of the international community to achieve its main 
objectives. One important reason why the international community were not able to react 
stronger against the nationalist parties and their discriminatory policies was due to the DPA 
itself (Nowak 2004: 50). In Article 2 (4) of Annex 3 in the DPA states that the first elections 
had to be held “six months after entry into force of this Agreement or, if the OSCE determines 
a delay necessary, no later than nine months after entry into force”. It was difficult to 
anticipate a free and fair elections to take place within nine months after a three and a half 
years of civil war and harsh policies of ethnic cleansing, that resulted forced displacement of 
half of the population. It was not surprising that the old nationalist parties won the election of 
14 September 1996 and most of the following elections. With a degree of democratic 
legitimacy granted by the international community, they were able to aspire their 
discriminatory policies (Nowak 2004: 51).  
The second important reason for the failure of the international community is that the civilian 
(peace-building) objective was split across different kinds of international organisations and 
institutions such as: the UN, UNHCR, OSCE, EU; CoE and various Dayton commissions and 
institutions under the quite weak coordinating and supervising authority High Representative 
and the respective decisions of the Peace Implementation Council. On the contrary, the 
military (peace-keeping) objective were successful, as it was organised by one organisation 
(NATO) and supplied with sufficient means in terms of military equipment and personnel. 
Besides that, the international community did not respond in a consistent manner under the 
responsibility of one organisation such as the UN. Two crucial years after the civil war were 
lost because of the competition between the several international players and the resistance 
of the States to attempt to enhance the role of the High Representative. Instead of dissolving 
the old nationalist parties and preventing them from the democratic institution-building 
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process, the international community conveyed the message that these parties and individual 
politicians were their counterparts in the peace-building process (Nowak 2004: 57).  
The National Attribution to the Success and Failure 
Local and national authorities have still not fulfilled their obligations under the DPA to ensure 
an environment that is durable to returns (Heimerl 2006: 79). One of the main goals of the 
DPA was to ensure that Bosnian police forces would operate in accordance with the important 
international policies hereunder the acknowledgement of internationally-recognized human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (Celador 2006: 58). The police, during the conflict and prior 
to, were politically biased, militarized, corrupt, ethnically divided, disrespectful and insulting 
of human rights and sloppy at ensuring the citizens’ security (Celador 2006: 58). The UN 
insisted that minority police officers in pre-war communitites would act as a ‘’confidence-
building measure’’ for refugees and IDPs wishing to go back (Celador 2006: 60-61). It was 
common for members of minority communities to be most at risk since they had the least 
sympathy from the local and national authorities and thereby having the least physical 
protection from the local police (Celador 2006: 59). The UN had planned to make this clear 
when they would arrive in the end of 1995 (Celador 2006: 66). To this Celador argues that: 
‘’Although the police are no longer part of the problem, they still cannot be regarded as part of 
the solution […] There are, nevertheless, occasions where they are failing to deal effectively 
with cases involving minority returnee victims’’ (Celador 2006: 66-67). The NATO-led IFOR 
quickly achieved success in separating the military elements, however, their administrators 
were unwilling to engage themselves in civil affairs, including the security of returnees. The 
international community was in reality allowing ethnic cleansing to succeed (Dahlman & 
Tuathail 2005: 579). ‘‘IFOR is not a police force and will not undertake police duties’’ an IFOR 
spokesperson stated during the war (Holbrooke 1998: 337 cited in Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 
583-584).  
 
The nationalist parties have been successful in blocking the implementation of the DPA and in 
continuing the ethnic/religious partition of the country. The achievement in the long-term 
institution-building process in the fields of pluralistic democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law and economic reconstruction are even less impressive. 50 percent of the population live 
in poverty, the nationalists parties, who are guilty in the ethnic cleansing, genocide and armed 
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conflicts, are still in power (Nowak 2004: 57). The local authorities adopted discriminatory 
housing laws and practices on legal terms so that, refugees and IDPs who did not return to 
their pre-war homes within limited period after the implementation of the DPA, had with 
their own will ‘abandoned’ their houses and properties. The nationalists parties used these 
abandoned properties to house their own ethnic/religious groups and by that, they continued 
their ethnic-cleansing objectives (Nowak 2004: 46). 
 
Moreover, systematic policies of discriminations against those ethnic/religious groups who 
were classed as minorities in their pre-war homes during the war or who tried to return were 
planned to reinforce the ethnic/religious partition in BiH. Even if a returning refugee of IDP 
family could have managed to repossess their house, they would face all types of obstacles 
originating from discriminatory policies. They would not be able to seek any jobs and were 
discriminated against in the areas of infrastructure, pension, health care, unemployment and 
other social security services and benefits. Their children must had to attend schools held by 
the majority group with curriculum that consisted of racist prejudices against them. What is 
more was that the neighbours would be hostile and the family would be victims of racist 
attacks and harassment (Nowak 2004: 50). These conditions including severely consumed 
housing stock, war-time property laws and a destroyed economy affected disturbed all 
returnees (Heimerl 2006: 74). It was especially a burden for  the people seeking to return to 
areas where they knew they would be in the minority, where they would most likely be 
confronted with all forms of discrimination, along with being viewed as the ‘others’ in a 
political environment still dominated by destructive nationalism. Beating of the newly 
arrived, the voluntary destruction of re-built house just before the owners returned, a lack of 
work or schooling opportunities, administrative harassment, problems accessing social 
services, obtaining valid identity papers, or the provision of water and power utilities is what 
minorities in a majority area would experience. Whereas minority returnees were victims of 
violence and intimidation, they were also victims of socio-economic discrimination at virtually 
every level, and this shows how the political factors are played out in socio-economic terms 
(Heimerl 2006: 74). 
In conclusion, it is hard to say that the international community was successful in repatriating 
the return of refugees and IDPs, which covertly also meant the reversal of ethnic cleansing. On 
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one hand, the international community will have to reassess whether the DPA was the best 
possible decision under the circumstances. They should ask themselves, what are the lessons 
that can be drawn and what can we learn for the future similar endeavours (Petrisch 2004: 
11). On the other hand, the nationalists parties have been successful in maintaining the 
ethnic/religious partition of the country and staying in power in both entities after the post-
war period even years after the end of the armed conflicts (Nowak 2004: 49). However, the 
statistics may be misleading if the barriers to return are often social and economic, and not 
only inter-ethnic ones (Chandler 2000: 105).   
Through this discussion, we found out that the international community provided several 
programmes, but no matter how much effort they put into it. The main reason why the 
international community was not that successful is because of the fact that there was no 
political willingness from the national authorities and the DPA itself. Besides that, there was 
no clear organisation since there were many independent organisations and the results from 
different programmes were inconsistent. The nationalist, on the other hand, were successful 
in pursuing their discriminatory policy, which was to discourage the minority returnees to 
live in their original or new area. Reflecting back to the Rational Choice Theory, it is 
understandable that most minority returnees and refugees, mostly young adults, choose to 
relocate to a majority area so they will get better opportunities to find jobs and education. 
However, the elderly mostly choose to return to their original because of the emotional tie 
with the village, but also there is a tendency for elderly people to feel lonely when they are 
relocated to a new unfamiliar area.  
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Conclusion 
The research questions was; How did the international and national communities attribute to 
the successfulness or failure of the Dayton Peace Agreement in relation to refugee returnees and 
internally displaced persons and why? It is almost twenty years since the DPA ended the war in 
BiH, yet there is still disagreements in the public opinion, both domestic and foreign, on how 
the international assistance to this war-torn country have helped the country (Petrisch 
2004:11).  
The DPA had made an unevenly distribution of settlement since the beginning and especially 
for Bosnian Muslims since we found out in the project that they got the least land despite that 
they were the biggest ethnic minority who suffered the most during the war. The Serbs and 
the Croats already had a country, but the Serbs and the Croat expanded their territory during 
the Bosnian war and when the DPA was implemented. The Serbs and Croats supported their 
own ethnic group in Bosnia, which meant that they could demand more territory thereby 
taking more land for themselves and for their countries.  
The international community implemented different minority return programmes, however, 
they provided more quantity than quality. Despite great efforts from the international 
communities, the local communes were resisting to be influenced so the displacement 
problem have not been completely solved. The inconsistency of return movements from the 
international community’s side, had led to several obstacles that the minority returnees faced 
such as being discriminated by the majority group and lacking security from the police. 
Whereas for the national authorities had benefited from the DPA by the fact that they won a 
legitimised election and thereby pursuing discriminatory policies where the High 
Representative could not interfere their local affairs. Stefanovic and Loizides (2004: 424) also 
state that one cannot only rely on the role of local actors, including community groups, when 
securing returnees.  
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While Dayton promised the right to return, it also created a de facto partition of Bosnia 
dividing what had once been a multiethnic country into ethno nationalist entities that 
acknowledged and effectively rewarded ethnic cleansing (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 577).  
The DPA was not supposed to be an exercise in state building. What it was intended to do was 
to provide the basis for peace. For that particular reason, its setup prioritized stability over 
democracy (Allock 2004: 25). While acknowledging the errors of the DPA, it is important to 
avoid believing that it might have been substituted effortlessly by a system that would be 
ideal (Allock 2004: 30). Based on our overall project we unveil that the DPA failed in relation 
to refugees and IDPs both on international and national level.  
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